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Turner: Turner: Retrospective Lawmaking in Missouri:

Retrospective Lawmaking in Missouri:
Can School Districts Assert Any:
Constitutional Rights Against the State?
Savannah R-III School District v. Public School Retirement
System ofMissouri
I. INTRODUCTION

The controversy in Savannah R-III School District v. Public School
Retirement System centered on the retrospective enactment by the Missouri
legislature of a law precluding numerous school districts from recovering
refunds of payments illegally collected by the Missouri Public School
Retirement System. The Missouri legislature used retrospective legislation to
eliminate the school districts' right to recovery. Despite a clear constitutional
prohibition against retrospective laws in Article I, section 13 of the Missouri
Constitution, the retroactive law at issue in Savannah R-III School District
withstood constitutional challenge.
The Missouri Supreme Court upheld the seemingly unconstitutional
retrospective law by means of a broad assertion that the legislature may waive
the rights of school districts at will. This conclusion may surprise many
communities that feel they have a direct interest at the local level in the
operation of their school districts and in the preservation of school district funds.
The Savannah R-III School District case illustrates the power of distant
government to tread upon rights which belong, at least in part, to local
communities.
This Note will first discuss retroactive lawmaking as it occurred in
Savannah R-III School District. Next, this Note will examine the status and
rights of school districts and the law in Missouri underlying retrospective civil
legislation. This Note will conclude with a comment on the dangers of
retroactive lawmaking and a discussion of why the rights of school districts
should be respected by the State in certain cases.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Despite a complex history of trial, appeal, remand and legislative
intervention, the Savannah R-IlI School Districtcase consists simply of a class
action brought by several Missouri school districts against the Missouri Public
School Retirement System (PSRS).2 The PSRS administers a pension plan for
teachers to which both teachers and school districts contribute.3 The class of

1. 950 S.W.2d 854 (Mo. 1997).
2. Id. at 855.
3. See Mo. REV.

STAT.

§ 169.020 (1994).
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school districts, also representing Missouri public school teachers, sued the
PSRS for a refund of overpayments made to the system and for a declaration that
a 1996 amendment to Section 169.030.3 of the Missouri Revised Statutes was
unconstitutional.4
The certified class of plaintiffs in this case consisted of two groups: public
school teachers who were members of the retirement system and school districts
that contributed to the retirement system as required by Section 169.030. 5 The
named representatives of the class were the Savannah R-III School District,
Sweet Springs R-VII School District, Cameron R-I School District and
Plattsburg R-III School District. 6 For the purposes of this Note, only the school
districts' claims are relevant, because the Court rejected the teachers' claims due
to a defect in class representation.
Section 169.030 of the Revised Statutes of Missouri requires public school
teachers and school districts to contribute to the Missouri PSRS to fund a
pension plan for teachers.8 Funding for the retirement system comes entirely
from teacher and school district contributions.9 Public school teachers are
required to make contributions based on a percentage of their "salary rate,"' and
school districts must match their teachers' contributions." The retirement
system board of trustees sets the contribution
rates,12 and the funds are used to
3
pay allowances to retired teachers.'
In 1970, the PSRS began notifying school districts that fringe benefits, such
as health insurance, were to be included in the salary rate on which the districts

4. SavannahR-III Sch. Dist., 950 S.W.2d at 855-56.

5. Id. at 856. The entire class consisted of approximately 573 school districts and
58,000 teachers. Id.
6. See Savannah R-III Sch. Dist. v. Public Sch. Retirement Sys., 912 S.W.2d 574,
574 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995), appealafter remand, Savannah R-III Sch. Dist. v. Public Sch.
Retirement Sys., 950 S.W.2d 854 (Mo. 1997).
7. Savannah R-111 Sch. Dist. v. Public Sch. Retirement Sys., 950 S.W.2d 854, 857
(Mo. 1997). Despite the teachers' original inclusion in the class, none of the class
representatives were teachers. Id. As a result, the Missouri Supreme Court found that
the representative school districts lacked standing to assert the teachers' rights' and
refused to consider the merits of the teachers' claims. Id. For this reason, this Note will
not discuss the teachers' specific claims.
8. Id. at 856. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 169.030 (1994 & Supp. 1997). The retirement
system was created and is governed by Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 169.010-. 141 (1994 & Supp.
1997).
9. SavannahR-IIISch. Dist., 950 S.W.2d at 856 (citing Mo. REV. STAT. § 169.030.1
(1994)).
10. Id. (citing Mo. REV. STAT. § 169.030.3 (1994)).
11. Id. (citing Mo. REv. STAT. § 169.030.1 (1994)).
12. Id. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 169.030.4 (1994).
13. Savannah R-III Sch. Dist. v. Public Sch. Retirement Sys., 950 S.W.2d 854, 856
(Mo. 1997) (citing Mo. REV. STAT. § 169.030.1 (1994)).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol63/iss3/8
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and teachers calculated their contribution amounts.'4 Though most of the school
districts complied with the direction, 5 the PSRS discovered in 1982 that some
districts were not including fringe benefits in their teachers' salary rates.' 6 When
the retirement system sued these school districts to enforce compliance, the
circuit court dismissed the suit, finding that no justiciable controversy existed
because the retirement system had
failed to adopt a rule officially promulgating
7
its interpretation of the statute.
The PSRS then issued a rule 8 on December 29, 1987, which defined
"salary rate," as used in Section 169.030.3, to include the value of health
insurance premiums or annuities.' 9 In response to this rule, the school districts
filed a lawsuit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that the rule
was contrary to Section 169.030.3.2 o The school districts also sought a refund
of prior contributions that had been made based on salary rates that included
health insurance benefits. 2' The circuit court certified the case as a class action,
upheld the rule, and granted summary judgment in favor of the retirement
system.22
The court of appeals reversed the circuit court and held that the "salary
rate" of Section 169.030.3 did not include fringe benefits such as health
insurance or annuities purchased in lieu thereof 23 The court also found the rule24
to be arbitrary and contrary to the statute's plain meaning." The court of
appeals reversed the grant of summary judgment in favor of the retirement
system and remanded the case to the circuit court for further proceedings.26

14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 856-57.
17. Id. at 857.
18. MO. CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 16,

§ 10-3.010(8) (1988).

19. Savannah R-III Sch. Dist. v. Public Sch. Retirement Sys., 950 S.W.2d 854, 857
(Mo. 1997).
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.

23. Id. (citing Savannah R-IlI Sch. Dist. v. Public Sch. Retirement Sys., 912 S.W.2d
574, 577 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995)).
24. MO. CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 16, § 10-3.010(8) (1988).
25. Savannah R-lII Sch. Dist. v. Public. Sch. Retirement Sys., 950 S.W.2d 854, 857
(Mo. 1997).
26. Id. (citing SavannahR-III Sch.Dist., 912 S.W.2d at 577).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1998
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While the case was pending in the circuit court on remand, the legislature
amended Section 169.010 to redefine the term "salary rate" so that it specifically
included medical benefits paid by the employer.27 The legislature also added the
following language to Section 169.030.3:
Contributions transmitted to the retirement system before the effective
date of this act [February 20, 1996], based on salary rates which either
included or excluded employer paid medical benefits for members,
shall be deemed to have been in compliance with this section. The
retirement system shall not refund or adjust contributions or adjust
benefit determinations with respect to any period before [February 20,
1996], solely because of the treatment of employer paid medical
benefits for members.28
Based on the 1996 amendment to Section 169.030.3, the PSRS moved to
29
dismiss the case on the grounds that the amendment mooted the controversy.
The school districts subsequently amended their petition to add constitutional
challenges to the 1996 amendment and moved for summary judgment.3" The
circuit court denied the school districts' motion, upheld the constitutionality of
Section 169.030.3 as amended in 1996, and granted the retirement system's
motion to dismiss. 3' The plaintiff school districts appealed this dismissal to the
Missouri Supreme Court.32 The school districts argued before the Missouri
Supreme Court that the 1996 amendment to Section 169.030.3 was an
unconstitutional enactment of a retrospective law.33
The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court,
finding that the 1996 amendment to Section 169.030.3 did not violate the
Missouri constitutional prohibition against retrospective laws. 34 The court held
that when school districts overpay a state agency and subsequently sue for a
refund, the Missouri legislature may constitutionally enact retroactive legislation

27. Id. (citing 1996 Mo. Laws 386).
28. Id. (citing 1996 Mo. Laws 387) (brackets in original).
29.
30.
31.
32.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

33. Id. at 858. The school districts also argued that the amendment impaired an
obligation of contract, violated the separation of powers requirement and was a prohibited
special law. Id. at 857-60. Because this Note will be limited to the constitutionality of
retrospective laws, a discussion of the plaintiffs' other rejected constitutional claims is
omitted.

34. Id. at 856, 860. The Missouri Supreme Court had jurisdiction in this case
because it involved the validity of a statute. Id. at 856 (citing MO. CONST. art. V, §3).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol63/iss3/8
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specifically to deny recovery to the school districts, without violating the
prohibition of retrospective laws found in the Missouri Constitution.
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND

A. Retrospective Laws
Article I, section 13 of the Missouri Constitution prohibits the enactment
of any law that is "retrospective in its operation., 36 Missouri courts consistently
define retrospective laws as those which "take away or impair vested rights
acquired under existing laws, or create a new obligation, impose a new duty, or
attach a new disability in respect to transactions or considerations already
past.' 37 Article I, section 13 does not prohibit retrospective laws merely relating
to past transactions, but rather, it prohibits laws that operate retrospectively,
affecting past transactions "to the substantial prejudice of parties interested. ' 38
in its operation" may also be referred to as a
A law that is "retrospective
"retroactive law., 39

35. Id. at 860. See infra Part III.A.
36. MO. CONST. art. I, § 13. The full text of Article I, section 13 provides: "[N]o
ex post facto law, nor law impairing the obligation of contracts, or retrospective in its
operation, or making any irrevocable grant of special privileges or immunities, can be
enacted." MO. CONST. art. 1, § 13.
37. State ex rel. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. v. Buder, 515 S.W.2d 409, 410 (Mo.

1974); see Doe v. Roman Catholic Diocese, 862 S.W.2d 338, 340 (Mo. 1993); Barbieri
v. Morris, 315 S.W.2d 711, 714 (Mo. 1958); Lucas v. Murphy, 156 S.W.2d 686, 689
(Mo. 1941); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Garffie, 939 S.W.2d 484,486 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997);
Kinder v. Peters, 880 S.W.2d 353, 355 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994); State ex rel. City of
Springfield v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 812 S.W.2d 827, 832 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991),
overruled in other respects by Missouri Mun. League v. State, 932 S.W.2d 400 (Mo.

1996; Elliot v. Kesler, 799 S.W.2d 97, 102 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990).
38. Cosada Villa, Inc. v. Missouri Dep't. of Soc. Serv., 868 S.W.2d 157, 160 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1994) (quoting Fisher v. Reorganized Sch. Dist. No. R-V, 567 S.W.2d 647, 649
(Mo. 1978) (emphasis added); see Beatty v. State Tax Comm'n, 912 S.W.2d 492, 495
(Mo. 1995) (citing Dial v. Lathrop R-II Sch. Dist., 871 S.W.2d 444, 447 (Mo. 1994)).
Another Missouri case states that:
There is no prohibition against the passage of laws which might be "retroactive," but not
"retrospective."
The constitutional inhibition against laws retrospective in operation... does not mean

that no statute relating to past transaction can be constitutionally passed, but rather, that
none can be allowed to operate retrospectively.., to the substantial prejudice of parties
interested.
State ex rel. Webster v. Myers, 779 S.W.2d 286, 289 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989) (quoting

Fisher,567 S.W.2d at 649).
39. Dial v. Lathrop R-II Sch. Dist., 871 S.W.2d 444, 447 (Mo. 1994). Though
these distinctions are worth noting, courts may mean the same thing when they refer to
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1998
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The prohibition of laws which change the legal ramifications of past actions
initially arose in American constitutional jurisprudence under Article I, section
9, clause 3 of the United States Constitution: "No Bill of Attainder or ex post
facto Law shall be passed.'"40 The Supreme Court determined early on in Calder
v. Bull, however, that the Ex Post Facto Clause applied only to criminal laws.4'
Since the United States Constitution does not contain an express provision
condemning the enactment of retrospective civil laws, after Calder,federal laws
that operated retroactively in the civil context had to be challenged under other
federal constitutional provisions, such as the Due Process Clause.42
Both federal and state-constitutions prohibit retrospective civil lawmaking,
but the means of achieving the prohibition vary. Retrospective laws may be
prohibited under the U.S. Constitution primarily through interpretation of the
Due Process Clause, 43 but also through the Bill of Attainder Provision," the
Contracts Clause, 45 or the Takings Clause.46 These provisions implicitly prohibit
retrospective civil laws under certain circumstances47 and apply to the states
through the 14th Amendment. State 'onstitutions generally contain provisions
similar to those of the United States Constitution under which the
constitutionality of retrospective laws may be challenged. While most states
condemn retrospective lawmaking indirectly through the interpretation of federal
or state constitutional provisions, a few state constitutions, including that of
Missouri, contain express provisions forbidding retrospective laws.48

retroactive laws, retrospective laws, or laws operating retrospectively as being
unconstitutional.
40. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
41. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 396 (1798).
42. See infra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
43. U.S. CONST. amend. V, § 1 ("No person shall.., be deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law;"); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("[N]or shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law;").
44. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 ("No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall
be passed."); U.S. CONST.art. I, § 10, cl. I ("No State shall. . . pass any Bill of Attainder
....");see also United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 315 (1946) (striking down

statutory provision as bill of attainder).
45. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 ("No State shall.., pass any... Law impairing
the Obligation of Contracts. ..."); see also Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438
U.S. 234, 250-51 (1978) (striking down state act as violation of Contracts Clause).
46. U.S. Const. amend. V ("No person shall.., be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law;"). See generallyLucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
47. Harold J. Krent, The Puzzling Boundary Between Criminal and Civil
Retroactive Lawmaking, 84 GEO. L.J. 2143, 2149-50 (1996).
48. See COLO. CONST. art. II, § 11; GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, 10; IDAHO CONST. art.
XI, § 12; MD. CONsT. DECL. OF RIGHTS art. XVII; N.H. CONST.art. I, § 23; OHIo CONST.
art. II, § 28; TENN. CONST. art. I, § 20; TEX.CONST. art. I, § 16; see also N.C. CONST. art.
I, § 16 (banning retrospective tax laws).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol63/iss3/8
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Article I, section 13 of the Missouri Constitution contains both a prohibition
of Ex Post Facto laws in the criminal context and a prohibition of retrospective
civil laws:
That no ex post facto law, nor law impairing the obligation of
contracts, or retrospective in its operation, or making any irrevocable
grant of special privileges or immunities, can be enacted.4 9
The term "retrospective" in Article I, section 13 refers only to civil laws and
remedies,5 ° while "ex post facto" pertains solely to criminal laws. 5' The express
prohibition of retrospective civil laws is a relatively unique feature of the
Missouri Constitution, shared with only a few other states. 2
The divergence in the means by which federal and state constitutions
prohibit retrospective lawmaking raises the question of what sources of authority
may be used to construe Missouri law on the subject.53 The Missouri
Constitution contains a specific prohibition of retrospective civil laws in Article
I, section 13 which is absent from the United States Constitution. Consequently,
Missouri state precedent will be used exclusively to define the constitutional
bounds of retrospective lawmaking under Missouri constitutional law. As the

49. Mo. CONST. art. 1, § 13.
50. State ex rel. Webster v. Meyers, 779 S.W.2d 286, 289 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989)
(citing State v. Thomaston, 726 S.W.2d 448, 459 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987)).
5 1. "As used in both the State and Federal Constitutions the term ex post facto law
State ex rel. Jones v. Nolte, 165 S.W.2d 632,
applies only to criminal legislation ....
638 (Mo. 1942).
52. See supra note 48.
53. To examine state constitutional challenges to retroactive statutes, three
approaches may be used. Marshall J. Tinkle, ForwardInto the Past:State Constitutions
and Retroactive Laws, 65 TEMP. L. REv. 1253, 1255 (1992). First, where the state
constitutional provision is analogous to a federal constitutional provision, United States
Supreme Court and federal decisions construing the federal provision may be used to
interpret the state provision. Id. Second, state court opinions may be controlling when
the construction of the state provision departs from federal interpretation of the
comparable federal provision. Id. Lastly, reliance may be placed on state court decisions
where the state constitutional provision is not found in the United States Constitution.
Id.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1998
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retrospective law challenge in Savannah R-III School Districtwas brought solely
under the Missouri Constitution,54 federal precedent is largely irrelevant.5
Despite Missouri's express prohibition of retrospective laws in Article I,
section 13, the state legislature still enacts laws that operate retroactively. 56 The
propriety of retroactive lawmaking becomes questionable when the new law
affects vested rights.57 As stated above, retroactive laws are those which "take
away or impair vested rights acquired under existing laws, or create a new
obligation, impose a new duty, or attach a new disability in respect to
transactions or considerations already past., 58 Of the aforementioned terms,
"vested rights" appears to be the most ambiguous. A vested right, the
impairment of which renders a law retrospective in its operation, was described
by the court in Fisherv. ReorganizedSchool DistrictNo. R- V ofGrundy County
to be:
[S]omething more than a mere expectation based upon an anticipated
continuance of the existing law. It must have become a title, legal or
equitable, to the present or future enjoyment of property or to the
present or future enjoyment of the demand, or a legal exemption from
a demand made by another? 9
The prohibition in Article I, section 13 only applies when substantive rights
are affected. 60 Retrospective laws may be enacted "where the statute is only
procedural and does not affect any substantive rights of the parties.
Courts

54. See Savannah R-III Sch. Dist. v. Public Sch. Retirement Sys., 950 S.W.2d 854,
856 (Mo. 1997). The retrospective law and other claims raised in Savannah were brought
solely under the Missouri Constitution. Id. These same claims could, however, have
been brought under the United States Constitution. In practice, it is important to examine
the possibility of both federal and state constitutional claims. Even when federal and
state constitutions have identical provisions, state courts will have more leeway in
interpreting state constitutional provisions than federal provisions.
55. See Johnson v. Fankell, 117 S. Ct. 1800, 1804 (1997) ("Neither this Court nor
any other federal tribunal has any authority to place a construction on a state statute
different from the one rendered by the highest court of the state.").
56. See, e.g., Savannah R-III Sch. Dist., 950 S.W.2d at 857 (recognizing that the
legislature amended Section 169.030.3 to retroactively preclude refund claims against the
retirement system).
57. See Dial v. Lathrop R-II Sch. Dist., 871 S.W.2d 444, 447 (1994) (holding that
the constitutional prohibition against retroactive laws applies where the law impairs a
vested right or works substantial prejudice).
58. State ex rel. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. v. Buder, 515 S.W.2d 409, 410 (Mo.
1974); see cases cited supra note 37.
59. Fisher v. Reorganized Sch. Dist. R-V, 567 S.W.2d 647, 649 (Mo. 1978)
(citation omitted).
60. Doe v. Roman Catholic Diocese, 862 S.W.2d 338, 341 (Mo. 1993).
61. Brennecka v. Director of Revenue, 855 S.W.2d 509, 511 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993);
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol63/iss3/8
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must make the crucial determination of whether the right asserted is procedural
or substantive "because the bar against retrospective legislation has traditionally
been applied to only substantive laws.""2 "Generally, substantive laws are those
which relate to the rights and duties giving rise to a cause of action; procedural
laws relate to the machinery for processing the cause of action. '63 The Missouri
Constitution prohibits the retrospective application of substantive laws, while
procedural laws may operate retrospectively."
Missouri courts previously allowed a broad exception to the constitutional
prohibition against retrospective laws in cases where the legislature manifests
a clear intent for retrospective application. 65 The legislative intent exception was
recognized early on by courts.' From the outset, this exception made little sense
and clearly ran contrary to the constitutional prohibition in Article I, section 13.
In essence, the exception allowed the legislature to pass retroactive laws that
affected vested, substantive rights as long as the legislature manifested a clear
intent that the law was to operate retroactively. This previously accepted
exception was rejected outright in Doe v. Roman CatholicDiocese.67
In Doe, the Missouri Supreme Court rejected the "legislative intent"
exception to the constitutional prohibition of retrospectively applied statutes,
holding that even clear legislative intent will not permit retrospective
application. 68 The court stated that "[r]egardless of legislative intent, it should
69
be obvious that a statute cannot supercede a constitutional provision.
Nonetheless, at least two Missouri courts since Doe have erroneously quoted the
"legislative intent" exception as if it was still valid.70

see Doe 862 S.W.2d at 341; Cartwright v. Wells Fargo Armored Servs., 921 S.W.2d 165,
167 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996); Kinder v. Peters, 880 S.W.2d 353, 355 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994);
State Bd. of Registration for the Healing Arts v. Warren, 820 S.W.2d 564, 565 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1991); State ex rel. Webster v. Myers, 779 S.W.2d 286, 289 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989);
State v. Thomaston, 726 S.W.2d 448, 460 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
62. Doe, 862 S.W.2d at 341.
63. Id. (citing Wilkes v. Missouri Highway & Transp. Comm'n, 762 S.W.2d 27,
28 (Mo. 1988)). See Fletcher v. Second Injury Fund, 922 S.W.2d 402, 407 (Mo. Ct. App.
1996).
64. Doe, 862 S.W.2d at 341.
65. See State v. Thomaston, 726 S.W.2d 448,460 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987); State ex rel.
St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. v. Buder, 515 S.W.2d 409, 410 (Mo. 1974).
66. See Lucas v. Murphy, 156 S.W.2d 686, 690 (Mo. 1941); Supreme Council of
the Royal Arcanum v. Heitzman, 120 S.W. 628, 630 (Mo. Ct. App. 1909).
67. 862 S.W.2d 338, 341 (Mo. 1993).
68. Id.
69. Id. See also Deptartment of Soc. Servs. v. Villa Capri Homes, 684 S.W.2d 327,
332 n.5 (Mo. 1985) (stating that where the legislature manifests an intent that a statute
apply retrospectively, the intent only pertains to the construction of the statute and to
whether the presumption against retroactivity should not apply).
70. See Fletcher v. Second Injury Fund, 922 S.W.2d 402,407 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996);
Cartwright v. Wells Fargo Armored Servs., 921 S.W.2d 165, 167 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1998
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Under current Missouri law, to determine whether a law is
unconstitutionally retrospective, the dispositive issue is whether the law affects
a vested or substantive right of the party or whether the law is merely procedural
in nature.7 If the law is procedural in nature, then Article I, section 13 does not
apply. 72 If the law affects a substantive right, it is unconstitutional even if the
legislature has expressed a clear intent to legislate retroactively. 73
Another less obvious exception to the prohibition of retrospective laws
arose in Savannah R-III School District. The exception indicates that the state
may waive its own rights,74 including the rights of entities that are merely
"instrumentalities" of the state. 75
B. State Power To Waive the Rights ofSchool Districts
The Missouri Supreme Court in Savannah R-III School Districtstated that
"[b]ecause the retrospective law prohibition was intended to protect citizens and
not the state, the legislature may pass retrospective laws that waive the rights of
the state."76 This exception apparently permits the legislature to abrogate even
the substantive rights of a school district.77 However, the key to this exception
is a finding that the school district is an "instrumentality of the state.""8 By
defining the school district as a "state instrumentality," the legislature may waive
the rights of the school district to the same extent as it can waive the rights of the
state. 79 A school district's mixture of state and local functions may, however,
call into question the propriety of the "state instrumentality" categorization.
Many courts have commented on the nature and function of a school district
vis-A-vis the state. In State ex rel.Independence School Districtv. Jones,80 the
Court stated the general proposition that "[s]chool districts are bodies corporate,
instrumentalities of the state established by statute to facilitate effectual
discharge of the General Assembly's constitutional mandate to establish and
maintain free public schools ... ."8' The Court also stated that "[a]s 'creatures

71. State v. Thomaston, 726 S.W.2d 448, 460 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
72. See Doe v. Roman Catholic Diocese, 862 S.W.2d 338, 341 (Mo. 1993).
73. Id.
74. Savannah R-III Sch. Dist. v. Public School Retirement Sys., 950 S.W.2d 854,
858 (Mo. 1997) (citing State ex rel. Meyer v. Cobb, 467 S.W.2d 854, 856 (Mo. 1971));
Graham Paper Co. v. Gehner, 59 S.W.2d 49, 51-52 (Mo. 1933)).
75. See discussion infra Part III.B.
76. Savannah R-II Sch. Dist., 950 S.W.2d at 858 (citing Meyer, 467 S.W.2d at
856; Graham, 59 S.W.2d at 51-52).
77. Id. (citing Dye v. School Dist. No. 32, 195 S.W.2d 874, 879 (Mo. 1946)).
78. Id.
79. Id. See also Dye, 195 S.W.2d at 879 (recognizing that the legislature may
waive or impair the vested rights of school districts).
80. 653 S.W.2d 178 (Mo. 1983).
81. Id. at 185.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol63/iss3/8
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of the legislature,' the rights and responsibilities of school districts are created
and governed by the legislature. '82 Based on such attributes, other courts have
concluded that "the legislature may waive or impair the vested rights of school
districts without violating the retrospective law prohibition., 83 Part of the
reasoning would seem to be that school districts are state agencies fulfilling a
state purpose because public education is a constitutional obligation of the
legislature.84
However, the nature of a school district may not be so clearly governmental
in every respect. Missouri cases deciding questions of sovereign immunity in
the public school context discuss in depth the legal nature of a school district.
Modem sovereign immunity cases indicate that school districts can be
considered something other than mere state instrumentalities for some purposes.
Under the theory that a school district constitutes simply an "arm of the state,"
a school district may claim sovereign immunity as much as the state itself 8 To
be immune, the school district must be found to be an "arm of the state." 6 The
sovereign immunity cases recognize, however, that a school district is not "the
state" for all purposes. These cases draw a distinction between*a district's
governmental and proprietary functions. The "governmental-proprietary"
analysis in these cases helps illustrate how a school district may be more like a
local political subdivision and less like an arm of the state in certain
circumstances.
In Beiser v. Parkway School District,87 the Missouri Supreme Court
compared school districts to municipalities. 8 The court stated that while "a
municipality can perform both proprietary and governmental functions and loses
sovereign immunity when performing proprietary functions, [a] special
government district... is an arm of the state, and can by its nature perform only
governmental functions for which it will enjoy sovereign immunity., 89 In

82. Id.
83. Savannah R-II Sch. Dist. v. Public Sch. Retirement Sys., 950 S.W.2d 854, 858
(Mo. 1997) (citing Dye v. School Dist. No. 32, 195 S.W.2d 874, 879 (Mo. 1946)). This
idea has been expressed in other jurisdictions as well. See Rousselle v. Plaquemines
Parish Sch. Bd., 633 So. 2d 1235, 1247 (La. 1994); Duplechain v. St. Landry Parish Sch.
Bd., 657 So. 2d 110, 113 (La. Ct. App. 1995) ("This state may constitutionally pass
retrospective laws waiving or impairing its own rights or those of its subdivisions.., as
long as private rights are not infringed.").
84. See MO. CONST. art. IX, § 1(a); Savannah R-III Sch. Dist., 950 S.W.2d at 858
(citing Jones, 653 S.W.2d at 185); Alex J. Grant, When Does the Clock Start Ticking?:
Applying the Statute ofLimitations in Asbestos PropertyDamageActions, 80 CORNELL
L. REv. 695, 732 (1995).
85. Allen v. Salina Broad., Inc., 630 S.W.2d 225, 226-27 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982).
86. Id.
* 87. 589 S.W.2d 277 (Mo. 1979).
88. Id. at 280.
89. Id. (citations omitted).
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Beiser, the court reaffirmed its previous position from Rennie v. Belleview
School District that examining the governmental-proprietary distinction for
school districts would serve no useful purpose. 90 Despite holdings of this sort,
courts soon began to question whether a school district was an arm of the state
for all purposes.
Although the prevailing view was that school districts served "one single
and noble purpose, viz., to educate the children of the district,"'" the Missouri
Supreme Court in State ex rel. Allen v. Barker moved away from this previous
position and declared that the functions of a school district that do not serve this
"noble purpose" are proprietary functions that do not afford immunity to a
school district. 92 The court indicated, in Barker, that the governmentalproprietary distinction could be applied to school districts such that a district
would not be considered an arm of the state for some purposes.93
To make the distinction, governmental functions can be considered those
that concern the state in general while proprietary functions relate to local
necessities and the conveniences of a school district's citizens.94 Another
consideration is whether the function or activity is done more for the benefit of
the state or for the benefit of the community.95 As the governmental-proprietary
distinction clearly applies to school districts, 9 6 these sovereign immunity cases
indicate that school districts may not be mere instrumentalities or arms of the
state for all purposes.
IV. INSTANT DECISION
In the instant case, the Missouri Supreme Court held that the 1996
amendment to Section 160.030.3 did not violate the prohibition of retrospective
laws in Article I, section 13 of the Missouri Constitution and that the school
districts were not entitled to a refund of the overpayments they made to the

90. Id. (citing Rennie v. Belleview Sch. Dist., 521 S.W.2d 423, 424 (Mo. 1975)).
91. Allen v. Salina Broad., Inc., 630 S.W.2d 225, 226-27 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982)
(citing Kansas City v. School Dist., 201 S.W.2d 930, 933 (Mo. 1947)).
92. 581 S.W.2d 818, 825 (Mo. 1979).
93. Id. (holding that the governmental-proprietary distinction "is still viable and
must be applied").
94. Allen, 630 S.W.2d at 227.
95. Id. at 227-28 ("It is proper to consider whether the activity is primarily for the
advantage of the state as a whole or for the special local benefit of the community
involved .... ") (citations omitted).
96. See Gabbett v. Pike County Mem'l Hosp., 675 S.W.2d 950, 951 (Mo. Ct. App.
1984); Fowler v. Board of Regents, 637 S.W.2d 352, 353 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) ("It is
correct that some functions performed by school districts may be considered proprietary
and that suits arising therefrom will not be barred by sovereign immunity."); Allen v.
Salina Broad., Inc., 630 S.W.2d 225, 226 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol63/iss3/8
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Public School Retirement System.97 The court found that the legislature
intended the retrospective law prohibition in Article I, section 13 to protect
citizens and not the state, and concluded that the legislature could waive the
vested rights of the school districts without violating the retrospective law
prohibition because school districts were instrumentalities of the state.98
Judge Robertson criticized this decision in his dissenting opinion, arguing
that the court was ignoring the plain language of the constitution.99 He
contended that because school districts were more akin to municipal
corporations than to state entities, the school districts' rights could not be waived
by the legislature."O
V. COMMENT
The Savannah R-III School District decision illustrates in a shocking
manner, the extent to which a politically unpopular lawsuit can be nullified by
legislative action and judicial deference. When the legislature realized that the
courts were about to require the Public School Retirement System to pay
enormous refunds to the plaintiff school districts, it hastily enacted legislation
to stop that result. 01' The Missouri Supreme Court suggested in its opinion that
the school districts did, in fact, have a vested right in the overpayments collected

97. Savannah R-III Sch. Dist. v. Public Sch. Retirement Sys., 950 S.W.2d 854, 858,
860 (Mo. 1997). Though this Note limits its discussion to retrospective lawmaking, the
court also disposed of the plaintiffs' other constitutional claims, holding that the 1996
amendment to Section 160.030 did not violate the separation of powers requirement
because the amendment did not abrogate a final adjudication of the school districts'
claim. Id. at 859. The amendment did not impair an obligation of contract in violation
of Article I, section 13 of the Missouri Constitution because the relationship between the
retirement system and the school districts was purely statutory and not contractual. Id.
at 857. Furthermore, the amendment was not a "special law" in violation of Article III,
section 40(25) of the Missouri Constitution because the law had a rational relation to a
legitimate government objective. Id. at 860.
The court also disposed of the teachers' claims early in the opinion by reasoning

that because the school districts' claim had become moot, the class action had to fail for
the teachers because none of the named class representatives were teachers. Id. at 85758. The court stated, however, that "[t]he analysis of this constitutional claim would be
different had any one of the named parties been a teacher." Id. at 858.
98. Savannah R-1I Sch. Dist., 950 S.W.2d at 858. Judge Holstein wrote the
opinion in which Judge Covington and Judges Smith and Crahan, sitting by designation,
concurred. Id. at 860. Judge Price concurred in the result. Id. Judge Limbaugh
concurred in the dissenting opinion of Judge Robertson, and Chief Justice Benton and

Judge White did not sit for this case. Id. at 860.
99. Id. at 861.
100. Id. at 860-62.
101. The legislature amended Section 169.030.3 "in an apparent attempt to put to
rest the pending litigation." Id. at 857.
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by the Public School Retirement System.'0 2 Fortunately for the court and for the
legislature, some Missouri precedent existed which allowed the legislature to
waive the rights of the state and state instrumentalities.10 3 By finding the school
districts to be "instrumentalities of the state" for these purposes,"° the
unconstitutional retrospective legislation could be upheld. Though the decision
has some precedential justification, the outcome raises some troubling questions.
First, should courts go to such lengths to uphold retrospective legislation
when the Missouri Constitution clearly prohibits such legislation in Article I,
section 13? Second, after this decision, do school districts have any
constitutional rights that are enforceable against the state? The opinion suggests
that they do not.10 5
The Missouri Supreme Court has grappled with the issue of retrospective
lawmaking for years. In 1974, it stated:
The underlying repugnance to the retrospective application of laws is
that an act or transaction, to which certain legal effects were ascribed
at the time they transpired, should not, without cogent reasons,
thereafter be subject to a different set of effects which alter the rights
and liabilities of the parties thereto.
Merely to label certain consequences as substantive and others as
procedural does not give sufficient consideration to this principle, and
notions of justice and fair play in a particular case are always
germane. 10
Without question, "[t]he principle that the legal effect of conduct should
ordinarily be assessed under the law that existed when the conduct took place
has timeless and universal human appeal."'0 7 Though retrospective lawmaking
does provide the legislature with a means of achieving particular goals, the

102. The court rejected the Article I, section 13 challenge on the grounds that "the

legislature may waive or impair the vested rights of school districts." Id. at 858.
103. The court based the constitutional waiver of vested rights on Dye v. School
DistrictNo. 32, 195 S.W.2d 874, 879 (Mo. 1946). See Savannah R-III Sch. Dist.v. Public
Sch. Retirement Sys., 950 S.W.2d 854, 858 (Mo. 1997).
104. SavannahR-IIISch. Dist., 950 S.W.2d at 858.
105. Though the teachers who overpaid the retirement fund could still possibly
collect their refund in a separate action, this would not replenish the local school districts'
treasuries that the PSRS depleted by erroneously requiring payments.

106. State ex rel. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. v. Buder, 515 S.W.2d 409, 411 (Mo.
1974).
107. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 855 (1990)
(Scalia, J., concurring).
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question remains as to whether these goals outweigh the potential harm to the
affected party and to society." 8
Retroactive legislation does possess some positive attributes. It provides
the legislature with the flexibility necessary to address social and political
concerns.' 09 It also allows the legislature to "rectify omissions, prevent
unfairness, and maintain the integrity of state or federal programs."" Despite
the clear and unambiguous language of Article I, section 13, court interpretations
soften the constitutional prohibition in order strike a balance between the needs
of protecting citizens and the benefits that retrospective lawmaking often
achieves for society.
Missouri courts originally began approving retroactive laws that constituted
curative legislation designed to fix some legislative oversight."' However, the
category of curative legislation is often extended to cover legislative omissions
and mistakes." 2 Undoubtedly, the ability to pass retroactive laws provides the
legislature with a very useful tool to meet its policy objectives." 3
Conversely, permissive retroactive lawmaking possesses numerous
undesirable attributes. Retrospective laws destroy reliance interests" 4 and often
place an inordinate burden on particular groups. "Individuals should be able to
rely on existing law when ordering their affairs. Clear legal obligations
maximize an individual's freedom of action.""'
"Individuals' financial
expectations and investments can be dramatically sundered by applying new
laws retroactively. ' 6 These dangers extend equally to local political
subdivisions. Restraining the government's ability to affect vested rights
through retroactive civil laws may be necessary to avoid imposing inequitable
burdens both on individuals and entities such as school districts.

108. Krent, supra note 47, at 2158.
109. Krent, supra note 47, at 2151-52.
110. Krent, supra note 47, at 2156.

111. See generallyState ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. Miller, 66 Mo. 328, 340 (1877)
(upholding statute ratifying contract previously made by a municipal corporation); Barton
County v. Walser, 47 Mo. 189, 205 (1871) (upholding act validating titles to previously
sold swamp lands).

112. See Krent, supra note 47, at 2156 n.80 (citations omitted); Christopher L.
Thompson, Note, Special Legislation Analysis in Missouri and the Need For
ConstitutionalFlexibility,61 Mo. L. REV. 185, 199-200 (1996).
113. Krent, supra note 47, at 2156.
114. See Usery v. Turner Elkhom Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1976) (upholding

retrospective liability for disabilities of former employees under the Federal Coal Mine
Health and Safety Act of 1969)); Krent, supra note 47, at 2143 (citing Pension Benefit
Guar. Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 734 (1984) (upholding retroactive
effective date of withdrawal liability provisions of Multiemployer Pension Plan
Amendments Act)).
115. Krent, supra note 47, at 2160.
116. Krent, supra note 47, at 2163.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1998

15

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 63, Iss. 3 [1998], Art. 8
MISSOURI LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 63

In addition, retroactive lawmaking may promote legislative self-dealing.
Legislators may curry favor with influential campaign contributors to ensure
their reelection." 7 By either eliminating or strictly applying the Missouri
constitutional prohibition on retrospective laws, the governed may be better
protected against favoritism and graft. '8
Some of the dangers of retrospective lawmaking may be counteracted by
lobbying efforts. Lobbying can help affected groups combat retroactive
legislation that undermines their interests." 9 One commentator argues that the
primary check on retroactivity in the civil context is "the ability of those targeted
to organize collectively to block any retroactive measure .. . .,1 20 "[G]roups
targeted by retroactive civil legislation can often form effective coalitions to
repulse any retroactive initiative. ' ' 2 The strength of this protection is, however,
questionable.
In Savannah R-III School District,lobbying efforts worked to the detriment
of the school district plaintiffs. Many Missouri education-based organizations
lobbied against payment of the refund. 22 Their efforts prompted the legislature
to hastily enact the 1996 amendment to Section 169.030.3. The educational and
teachers' organizations concentrated their efforts and successfully defeated the
plaintiffs' recovery. The school districts had a significantly diminished recourse
to oppose these lobbying efforts, as they were pitted against the organizations
that had traditionally supported, rather than opposed, their interests.
Clearly, in Savannah R-III School District,the protection of lobbying failed
for the school districts. Whether the legislature acted subjectively for the benefit
of the public, or to please educational organizations, cannot be ascertained
absolutely. Regardless, the end result is that a multitude of school districts and
school teachers were required to pay more than their fair share into the
retirement fund. The legislature retroactively squelched their vested right to pay
only their legally required share.
117. See Krent, supra note 47, at 2159.
118. See Krent, supra note 47, at 2159.
119. See Krent, supra note 47, at 2146.
120. Krent, supranote 47, at 2183.
121. Krent, supra note 47, at 2174. For example, when Hallmark Cards, Inc., was
threatened with the loss of tax benefits regarding their multi-million dollar pension plans,
the corporation successfully lobbied the Missouri legislature for a law protecting them
against this loss. Dan Margolies, CourtDenies CreditorsAccess to Pensions ofDebtors
in Bankruptcy, KANSAS CITY Bus. J., July 10, 1992, at 11.

122. Several associations representing the interests of retired and active teachers
and school administrators covered by the retirement plan were permitted to intervene as
defendants, including the Missouri State Teachers Association, the Retired Teachers
Association of Missouri, the Missouri National Education Association, Cooperating
School Districts of the St. Louis Suburban Area, the Missouri Association of School
Administrators, the Missouri Association of Elementary School Principals, and the
Missouri Association of School Board Officials. Savannah R-III Sch. Dist. v. Public Sch.
Retirement Sys., 950 S.W.2d 854, 856 n.2 (Mo. 1997).
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Though the result in Savannah R-III School Districtcalls into question the
propriety of retrospective lawmaking, the Missouri Supreme Court did not take
the opportunity to discuss retrospective lawmaking at length in its opinion. It
concluded that even though the school districts may have had a vested right in
a refund of the overpayments, the legislature could waive the school districts'
constitutional right not to be subjected to retrospective laws because the school
districts were "creatures of the legislature" and "instrumentalities of the state."'
The reasoning continues that if the legislature can waive the rights of the state,
it can also waive the rights of school districts.
Though the proposition that the legislature may waive the rights of the state
or one of its agencies does have some precedential basis, the threshold
"governmental-proprietary" distinction found in other cases should be extended
to legislative waivers of the rights of school districts. The governmentalproprietary distinction found in sovereign immunity cases seems to suggest that
a threshold determination should be made, with regard to the right asserted, as
to whether a school district is in fact an arm of the state, or rather, an entity more
akin to a political subdivision protecting local interests.
The dissenting opinion in Savannah R-III School District suggested that
such a determination should have been made in the court's decision. Judge
Robertson stated that "[i]n formation and purpose, the [school districts] are more
municipal corporations that they are state entities.', 24 The majority did not,
however, espouse this view in its decision.
The irony of the situation lies in the fact that a school district may lose the
cloak of sovereign immunity when it performs proprietary as opposed to
governmental functions. Thus, when a school district is sued, it may not claim
immunity unless it is shown to be an arm of the state for that purpose. However,
when a school district asserts claims against the state, no determination of
governmental or proprietary rights or interests appears to be necessary before the
legislature can waive a school district's claim of immunity.
For the purposes of determining whether sovereign immunity exists, courts
will undertake an analysis of whether the action of the school district was
governmental or proprietary in nature. " 5 This determination should be extended
to the legislature's waiver of a school district's rights, constitutional or
otherwise. If the nature of the right claimed or the action by the school district
appears to be proprietary rather than governmental, then the legislature should
be required to respect that the right belongs to the school district and not to the
state. Rights belonging to school districts in a proprietary sense should not be
waivable by the legislature, and courts should protect these proprietary rights.
The dissenting opinion in Savannah R-III School Districtclearly expressed the
nature of this injustice as follows:

123. Id. at 858.
124. Id. at 860 (Robertson, J., dissenting).
125. Allen v. Salina Broad., Inc., 630 S.W.2d 225, 226 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982).
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Surely the plaintiff school districts-created at the option of the local
citizenry and receiving not only state money but local tax revenue to
support their operations-have a legally protectible interest in paying
only so much of their state funds/local tax 2revenues
to the public
6
school retirement system as the law requires.
Though school districts are created or permitted by the legislature, their
functions are not only governmental in nature, but also concern local interests.
The sovereign immunity cases acknowledge this. The school district treasury
receives funding from both state and local tax revenues. The disposition of the
funds serves both the state and the local community. The school districts'
obligation to preserve their funds thus involves an obligation to the state and an
obligation to the local taxpayers. When the legislature under the facts of the
Savannah R-III School District case waives the school districts' right to a refund
of overpayments, it not only impairs the substantive rights of the school districts,
but also those of the local community who will suffer directly from the loss of
funds. If the courts permit the legislature to waive a party's rights on the
grounds that the party is merely an "arm of the state," a threshold determination
similar to that used in sovereign immunity cases should be made to prevent
injustice.
In Savannah R-II School District, the attempt by the school districts to
recover funds from the PSRS arguably constituted proprietary action. The
school district tried to protect the funds primarily for the benefit of the local
community, not for the state. Without questioning the validity of the state's
ability to waive its own rights, Missouri courts should at least make the
distinction between governmental and proprietary interests before abridging the
rights of entities which perform both state and local functions.
VI. CONCLUSION
The ability of the legislature to waive the rights of school districts and to
enact retroactive laws should come under closer scrutiny in order to preclude the
State from trampling on the rights of school districts or other local political
subdivisions. The "governmental-proprietary" distinction, as used in cases of
sovereign immunity, should logically be extended to legislative waivers of
school districts' rights to ensure that local interests are not frustrated by undue
governmental interference and overreaching. Such a requirement may have kept
the legislature from intervening in ongoing litigation, as it did in SavannahR-III
School District,to the detriment of school districts and their local constituents.

126. Savannah R-IllSch. Dist., 950 S.W.2d at 861 (Robertson, J., dissenting).
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This issue and the problems of retroactive lawmaking may be ripe for a more
thorough state constitutional analysis in future cases.
MATTHEW D. TURNER
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